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The Potential of Tariff Policy for Climate
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Thomas COTTIER, Olga NARTOVA & Anirudh SHINGAL*
This article addresses a potential role that tariff policy can play in encouraging countries to take
part in a multilateral effort to mitigate climate change: it complements discussions on border tax
adjustment which in law is limited to domestic taxation. It assesses whether increasing tariffs on
products from polluting industries amounts to a violation ofWorld Trade Organization (WTO)
rules and whether protectionism in this case can be differentiated from genuine environmental
concerns. It argues that while lowering tariffs on environmental goods may serve as a carrot to
promote dissemination of cleaner technologies, tariff deconsolidation is a legitimate stick to
encourage polluting countries to move towards an international climate agreement. The article
further explores this view by undertaking a partial equilibrium analysis to examine the impact of
a unilateral 5% tariff increase on the most carbon-intensive imports from countries not
committed to climate polices. Our results, however, suggest that plurilateral action would be more
effective than countries pursuing tariff policy in isolation, with the former leading to an average
1.4% net reduction in carbon-intensive imports from a 5% increase in their tariffs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Climate change mitigation and adaptation measures are at the heart of the
contemporary economic, legal, and political debate. A major effort to reach a
common understanding was made in December 2009 in Copenhagen and in
Cancun in 2010. The overall goal for the United Nations Climate Change
Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in Denmark was to establish a global climate
agreement intended to enter into force in 2013 following the end of the Kyoto
Agreement’s first commitment period. Unfortunately, the conference did not
achieve a binding agreement, a ‘Copenhagen accord’1 was merely ‘taken note of ’
* Thomas Cottier, Professor of European and International Economic Law, Managing Director,
World Trade Institute, University of Bern (thomas.cottier@iew.unibe.ch). Olga Nartova, Senior
Research Fellow, World Trade Institute, University of Bern and Assistant Professor of Hekma
School of Business and Law (olga.nartova@wti.org). Anirudh Shingal, Senior Research Fellow,
World Trade Institute, University of Bern (anirudh.shingal@wti.org).
1 UNFCC, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, Draft decision -/CP.15, Proposal by the President Copenhagen
Accord, 18 Dec. 2009, available at www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf.
Cottier,Thomas; Nartova, Olga & Shingal,Anirudh. ‘The Potential of Tariff Policy for Climate Change
Mitigation: Legal and Economic Analysis’. Journal of World Trade 48, no. 5 (2014): 1007–1038.
© 2014 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands
by the COP as there was no consensus.2 The subsequent Conference in Cancun
(COP 16) formalized some of the political results achieved in Copenhagen. It
showed the way for further work on a multilateral system, but again failed to bring
about a common and shared approach, let alone agreement on specific tools.The
same results characterized the 2013 Conference in Warzaw (COP 17). The
prospects of achieving common standards and programmes on abatement are dim.
Countries continue to prefer to adopt and develop domestic measures suitable to
their political environment and levels of economic and social development.
Against this backdrop, the question arises as to how governments are able to
unilaterally create incentives inducing other countries to restructure production
towards carbon friendly modes and to seriously consider participation in a
multilateral system on climate change mitigation and adaption. Overcoming
free-riding and collective action problem calls for new approaches beyond the
existing and widely discussed option of carbon taxes and border tax adjustment.
The article addresses a potential role that unilateral tariffs, being the most classical
tools of trade policy, can play in encouraging countries to take part in a
multilateral effort to mitigate climate change. It assesses in particular whether
increasing tariffs on products from energy intensive or polluting industries
amounts to a violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and whether
protectionism in this case can be differentiated from genuine environmental
concerns.
The question arises within the broader context to what extent countries can
use unilateral measures for environmental purposes.While adjustment of domestic
taxes at the border has been widely discussed, tariff policy has not attracted much
attention except for failed efforts at lowering tariffs on environmental friendly
goods.Tariff increases have not been considered.This may be due to the fact that
the global trading system has been engaged in reducing tariffs, and increases in
import tariffs are generally considered against the spirit of the global trading
system and are generally discouraged. New challenges, however, call for new
responses.
We conclude that WTO members can use tariff policy. They may reduce
tariffs on specific carbon friendly products.They may equally deconsolidate bound
tariffs in the pursuit of CO2 abatement.The very purpose of such measures is to
favour trade in low carbon products and processes and to encourage countries to
join the multilateral effort which in return supports recourse to and development
of technologically advanced products by restricting carbon intensive production.
2 For more on the discussion about the main results of the Accord see ‘Is there a silver lining to the
failure to strike a global climate deal? Outcome and perspectives of the Copenhagen Conference’, Brown Bag
seminar presentation by Dr Joëlle de Sépibus, NCCR Trade Regulation (Work Package 5: Trade
and Climate Change), held on 28 Jan. 2010 World Trade Institute, Berne, Switzerland.
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Tariff measures will be interpreted by some as disguised protectionism instead
of genuine concern about the climate, since the tariffs would permit the
competing domestic industries to increase production. Others, however, will
consider the possibility to refer to tariff protection against highly polluting
products and related processes as a suitable means to encourage others to join an
agreed international system of CO2 abatement In particular, the threat and
imposition of tariff increases against outsiders, and abstention from doing so within
a treaty-based system of multilateral abatement, may induce countries to overcome
free-riding and abstention. Tariff reductions or elimination on carbon friendly
processes and tariff increases on polluting products not only have the potential to
reduce production of such products, but also to create incentives to join a system
of agreed CO2 reductions.
Since emissions of Member States to an agreed international system are
capped, its domestic industries cannot increase environmentally harmful
production and will be on par with foreign industries that use clean technology.
Hence, existing tariffs do not create advantages for domestic industries and cannot
be considered as a protectionist measure if the country is a member of an
international climate change mitigation agreement. These tariffs may even be
eliminated within that system. The above motivation clearly does not apply to
countries that are not a member of a post-Kyoto agreement. Their uncapped
products and processes will be exposed to the full effect of tariffs protecting
domestic products from carbon intensive and cheaper imports
We therefore argue that while lowering tariffs for environmental goods can
serve as a carrot to promote dissemination of cleaner technologies, tariff
deconsolidation is an equally legitimate stick to encourage polluting countries to
move towards an international climate agreement. We explore this view by
conducting a partial equilibrium simulation to examine the impact of a unilateral
unit increase in tariffs on the imports of the most carbon-intensive products (as
identified in this literature) from countries not committed to climate polices
(non-Annex I, Kyoto Protocol). Our results suggest that the committed importing
countries would have to raise their tariffs only slightly to bring about a significant
decline in the imports of uncapped products from the non-committed countries,
thereby suggesting the effectiveness of such a measure in pushing countries
towards a global climate policy.
The article sets out with a brief introduction to scientific evidence regarding
climate change causes and consequences, and then touches upon economic
incentives to take multilateral mitigation measures (II). It then analyses the WTO
rules relevant for trade related mitigation measures (III) and examines the
WTO-compatibility of tariff deconsolidation (IV). It finally conducts a partial
equilibrium analysis to examine the impact of a unilateral unit increase in tariffs
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on the imports of the most carbon-intensive products (as identified in this
literature) from countries not committed to climate polices (non-Annex I, Kyoto
Protocol). The article concludes on a note proposing a coherent approach to
climate regime in theWTO (VI).
2 SETTINGTHE SCENETO CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
2.1 CLIMATE CHANGE: THE NEED FOR ACTION
2.1[a] Global Warming Evidence, Consequences, and Causes
Global warming of the climate system can be detected in temperature observations
taken at the surface, in the troposphere and in the oceans. Observational evidence
from all continents and most oceans shows that many natural systems are being
affected by regional climate changes, particularly temperature increases.3
According to the Fourth Assessment Report of Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC),4 ‘warming of the climate system is unequivocal’ and
evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean
temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and the rising global average sea
level.5 At continental, regional, and ocean basin scales, numerous long-term
changes in climate have been observed, including changes in arctic temperatures
and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns
and aspects of extreme weather including droughts, heat waves and the intensity of
tropical cyclones.The Fifth Draft Assessment Report published in 2013 essentially
corroborates these findings.
Changes in snow, ice and frozen ground have with high confidence6 increased
the number and size of glacial lakes, increased ground instability in mountain and
other permafrost regions and led to changes in some Arctic and Antarctic
ecosystems.There is high confidence that some hydrological systems have also been
affected through increased runoff and earlier spring peak discharge in many
3 S. Solomon et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge
University Press, 2007), para. 1.2.
4 The IPCC, created back in 1989, is a scientific body established by the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to provide
the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of climate change and its potential
environmental and socio-economic consequences.
5 S. Solomon et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge
University Press, 2007), paras 3.2, 4.2, 5.5.
6 A level of confidence is used in the Report to characterize uncertainty that is based on expert
judgment as to the correctness of a model, an analysis or a statement. The term high confidence
corresponds to about eight out of ten chances of being correct.
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glacier- and snow-fed rivers and through effects on thermal structure and water
quality of warming rivers and lakes.7 Regional-scale changes include increases in
the frequency of hot extremes, heat waves, and heavy precipitation and likely8
increases in tropical cyclone intensity.
Moreover, there is medium confidence9 that other effects of regional climate
change on natural and human environments are emerging, although many
are difficult to discern due to adaptation and non-climatic drivers. These include
the effects of temperature increases on agricultural and forestry management, some
aspects of human health, such as heat-related mortality in Europe, changes in
infectious disease vectors in some areas, and allergenic pollen, some human
activities in the Arctic (e.g., hunting and travel over snow and ice) and in
lower-elevation alpine areas (such as mountain sports).
2.1[b] The Impact of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Based on an assessment of thousands of peer-reviewed scientific publications,
Working Group 1 of the IPCC concluded that most of the observed increase
in global average temperatures since the mid-twentieth century is very likely10
due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas11 (GHGs)
concentrations.12 This is an advance since the IPCC Third Assessment Report
concluded that ‘most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely13 to
have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations’.14 Evident human
influences now extend to other aspects of climate, including ocean warming,
continental-average temperatures, temperature extremes, and wind patterns.
7 S. Solomon et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge
University Press, 2007), para. 1.2.
8 Likelihood, as defined in ‘IPCC Guidance Notes for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report on Addressing Uncertainties’, refers to a probabilistic assessment of some well
defined outcome having occurred or occurring in the future and may be based on quantitative
analysis or an elicitation of expert views. According to the Report’s likehood scale, likely
corresponds to more than 66% probability.
9 The term corresponds to about five out of ten chances of being correct.
10 The term corresponds to more than 90% probability.
11 GHG emissions covered by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) include: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphurhexafluoride (SF6).
12 See paras 9.4 and 9.5 in G.C. Hegerl et al., ‘Understanding and Attributing Climate Change’ in
S. Solomon, et al., (eds.), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge
University Press 2007).
13 The term corresponds to more than 66% probability.
14 IPCC,Third Assessment Report.
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Changes in atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and aerosols, land cover, and
solar radiation alter the energy balance of the climate system.The increase in the
concentration of CO2 during the past fifty years has passed beyond the range of
natural fluctuations.15 Global GHG emissions due to human activities have grown
since pre-industrial times, with an increase of 70% between 1970 and 2004.16
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most important anthropogenic GHG. Global
atmospheric concentrations of CO2, methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O)
have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far
exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning many thousands
of years.Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (379ppm) in 2005 exceed by far the
natural range over the last 650,000 years.17 Global increases in CO2
concentrations are due primarily to fossil fuel use and land-use change.
Continued GHG emissions at or above current rates would cause further
warming and induce many changes in the global climate system during the
twenty-first century that would very likely be larger than those observed during the
twentieth century.18
The IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) projects an
increase of global GHG emissions by 25%–90% (CO2-eq
19) between 2000 and
2030, with fossil fuels maintaining their dominant position in the global energy
mix to 2030 and beyond. But even if the concentrations of all GHGs and aerosols
had been kept constant at year 2000 levels, a further warming would still be
expected due to the fact that several GHGs remain in the atmosphere for very
long periods. Hence, prompt and strong action in emissions reduction is clearly
necessary.
2.1[c] Economic Incentives for Climate Change Mitigation
While the IPCC reports gave the scientific analysis of the climate change scourge,
the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change released in 2006
highlighted the economic costs of inaction or delay in action.The Stern Review
15 T. Stocker, ‘Earth in the Greenhouse – a Challenge for the Twenty-First Century’ in T. Cottier et
al. (eds.), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change: World Trade Forum
(Cambridge University Press 2009).
16 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Core Writing
Team, R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger (Eds.), IPCC.
17 Ibid.
18 See para. 3.2.1 in Hegerl, G.C. et al., ‘Understanding and Attributing Climate Change’ in S.
Solomon, et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group
I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge
University Press 2007).
19 CO2 equivalent.
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Report discussed the effect of climate change and global warming on the world
economy. Its main conclusion was that the benefits of strong, early action on
climate change would considerably outweigh the costs.
Using the results from formal economic models, the Review estimated that if
there was no action, the overall costs and risks of climate change would be
equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year. If a wider range of risks
and impacts were taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of
GDP or more.20 In contrast, the costs of action – reducing greenhouse gas
emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change – could be limited to
around 1% of global GDP each year.
Another study by the UNFCCC21 concluded that additional global
investment and financial flows amounting to USD 200–210 billion would be
necessary in 2030 to return global GHG emissions to the current levels.
According to Stern, the risks of the worst impacts of climate change can be
substantially reduced if greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere can be stabilized
between 450 and 550ppm CO2 equivalent (CO2e). The current level is 430ppm
CO2e today, and it is rising at more than 2ppm each year. Stabilization in this
range would require emissions to be at least 25% below current levels by 2050, and
perhaps much more.
Knutti et al.22 have used the climate model of reduced complexity of the
University of Bern23 and their results show that stopping global warming at 2°C
requires rapid implementation and efficient reduction of CO2 emissions. A
capping of atmospheric concentrations at twice the pre-industrial concentrations,
i.e., at around 560 ppm, would permit a global warming target of about 3°C. It is
evident from these calculations that the challenge increases rapidly with increasing
CO2 concentrations and more stringent temperature limits.
2.1[d] Safe Levels of GHG Emissions and the Precaution Principle
Although scientists are still unsure about the required pace of GHG emissions
reduction and level of ‘safe’ atmospheric concentrations, it has to be taken into
20 N. Stern, The economics of climate change: the Stern Review (Cambridge University Press 2007).
21 UNFCCC, ‘Report on the analysis of existing and potential investment and financial flows
relevant to the development of an effective and appropriate international response to climate
change’, 2007, http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/financial_mec
hanism_gef/application/pdf/dialogue_working_paper_8.pdf.
22 R. Knutti et al., ‘Probabilistic Climate Change Projections for CO2 Stabilization Profiles’,
Geophys. Res. Lett. 32 (2005), L20707.
23 T.F. Stocker, D.G.Wright & L.A. Mysak, ‘A Zonally Averaged, Coupled Ocean-Atmosphere Model
for Paleoclimate Studies’, J. Climate 5 (1992), 773–797.
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account that if efforts to limit net greenhouse gas emissions are not initiated before
scientific certainty is achieved, it may be too late to undo the damage.
With a view to limiting the civil liability of governments in prohibiting
potentially hazardous activities, environmental law developed the precautionary
principle.24 While the legal nature of this principle is still debated and
controversial in general public international law, precaution has obviously been
important and is most prominent in the field of climate change.The precautionary
principle provides that activities threatening to cause serious or irreversible damage
should be restricted or even prohibited even before scientific certainty about their
impact is established.
Reduction of GHG emissions is considered a necessary precautionary
measure which must be taken in order to avert what both the IPCC reports and
the Stern Review Report of 2006 warned would be catastrophic to the future
well-being of the eco-system.
2.2 MULTILATERAL AND UNILATERAL L MITIGATION MEASURES
Given the nature of the public good at hand, climate change clearly demands an
international response, based on a shared understanding of long-term goals and
agreement on frameworks for action. The 1992 UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol provide a basis for
international cooperation, along with a range of partnerships and other
approaches.The Framework Convention states in its preamble that ‘change in the
earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind’25
While geared at international cooperation, common concern does not legally
exclude unilateral action required to bring about more ambitious action now
required around the world.26
2.2[a] Policies for Emissions Reduction
A range of options exists to cut emissions. Emissions can be cut through increased
energy efficiency, changes in demand, and through adoption of clean power, heat,
and transport technologies.According to Stern, the power sector around the world
24 For more on precautinary principle and climate change see T. Cottier and S. Matteotti,
‘International environmental law and the evolving concept of common concern of mankind’ in T.
Cottier et al. (eds), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change: World Trade
Forum (Cambridge University Press 2009).
25 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, pmbl., 31 I.L.M. 849,
851.
26 Thomas Cottier, Philipp Aerni, Baris Karapinar, Sofya Matteotti, Joëlle de Sépibus, Anirudh
Shingal, The Principle of Common Concern and Climate Change, (forthcoming).
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would need to be at least 60% decarbonized by 2050 for atmospheric
concentrations to stabilize at or below 550ppm CO2e,
27 and deep emissions cuts
would also be required in the transport sector.
Even with very strong expansion of the use of renewable energy and other
low carbon energy sources, fossil fuels could still make up over half of global
energy supply in 2050. Coal would continue to be important in the energy mix
around the world, including in fast-growing economies.28 Extensive carbon
capture and storage would be necessary to allow the continued use of fossil fuels
without damage to the atmosphere. Cuts in non-energy emissions, such as those
resulting from deforestation and from agricultural and industrial processes, are also
essential. Diffusion of environmental goods and services (EGS)29 provides for
another opportunity to limit GHG emissions.
Effective policy to reduce emissions has several elements. The first is the
optimal pricing of carbon; the second is to support innovation and the deployment
of low carbon technologies; and the third is action to remove barriers to energy
efficiency. Last but not the least is a climate change communication strategy whose
purpose is to inform, educate and persuade individuals on the optimal response to
climate change.Most of the economic policies that can be used for climate change
mitigation have a trade angle and fall under the auspices of theWTO.30
2.2[b] Addressing Carbon Leakage
Following the Kyoto Protocol, some countries have introduced (or are planning to
introduce) cap-and-trade systems and other measures to curb CO2 emissions from
power generation and large industries. However, as climate change mitigation
policies are not implemented worldwide in a coherent manner, there are concerns
that emission reduction efforts in one country would be offset by emission
increases in non-carbon constrained regions. Reallocation of production from
countries with carbon reduction commitments to countries with no emissions
restrictions is termed ‘carbon leakage’.31 This can lead to the changes in trade
patterns worldwide and increase of market share of the countries without climate
27 N. Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press
2007).
28 World Energy Outlook 2008, International Energy Agency.
29 T. Cottier & D. Baracol, WTO Negotiations on Environmental Goods and Services: A Potential
Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2008/4,
2009.
30 For further information see T. Cottier et al. (eds), International Trade Regulation and the
Mitigation of Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
31 Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, B. Metz et al. (eds.), Cambridge
University Press, p. 665,WTO-UNEP Report Trade and Climate Change, 2009, p. 99.
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policies. So, the total volume of GHG emissions remains the same or even rises.As
observed by Krugman, ‘China announced that it plans to continue its reliance on
coal as its main energy source and that to feed its economic growth it will increase
coal production 30% by 2015.That’s a decision that, all by itself, will swamp any
emission reductions elsewhere’.32 Such leakage might therefore considerably
decrease the effectiveness of global climate change mitigation efforts. Policymakers
are therefore looking for specific policy measures to avoid carbon leakage. Some
countries have a domestic focus in addressing these issues. Others have also
suggested introducing measures such as sectoral approaches33 or border adjustment
schemes, which would have effects beyond their frontiers with the aim of levelling
the CO2 playing field.
34
However, it is widely recognized that the multilateral track for developing a
coherent worldwide climate change mitigation policy is still a preferred option.
International trade regulation has the potential to address these challenges and
support the effort to bring about a multilateral system in the field. It can serve
both as a carrot and as a stick to promote international cooperation in mitigating
climate change.
3 INTERNATIONALTRADE REGULATIONAND CLIMATE
CHANGE MITIGATION
3.1 KEY DISCIPLINES OF THEWTO AGREEMENTS
3.1[a] Non-discrimination
The national treatment principle is a key discipline of theWTO and the GATT. In
accordance with GATT Article III, a member shall not discriminate between its
own and like foreign products (giving them ‘national treatment’).35 The national
treatment principle may be particularly relevant in cases where a climate change
related regulation is applied differently to domestic and foreign producers.
According to the most-favoured nation clause, a WTO member shall not
discriminate between ‘like’ products from different trading partners (giving them
equally ‘most favoured-nation’ status). GATT Article I.1 provides that ‘any
32 P. Krugman, ‘Empire of Carbon’, New York Times, 14 May 2009.
33 Iron and steel, aluminium and cement are considered to be key sectors. See J. Stephenson, (2009)
– Post-Kyoto Sectoral Agreements: A Constructive or Complicating Way Forward? Round Table
on Sustainable Development background paper, OECD, Paris, 13 Mar. 2009.
34 For example, The US Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill) includes provisions
allowing the government to take action against trading partners that fail to meet US greenhouse
gas standards, but not before 2020.
35 T. Cottier, M. Oesch, International Trade Regulation. Law and Policy In the WTO, The European
Union and Switzerland, Cases Materials and Comments, Cameron May Ltd. London, 2005, P. 382.
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advantage, favour, privilege or immunity’ granted by any member to any product
originating in or destined for any other member shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other members.36
3.1[b] Exemptions
If a trade-related climate change measure is found to be inconsistent with one of
the core provisions of the GATT, justification could still be sought under Article
XX. Article XX GATT lays out a number of specific instances in which WTO
members may be exempted from GATT rules.The exception potentially applies to
all provisions of the Agreement, including those relating to tariffs in Article II and
Article XXVIII GATT, beyond disciplines on tariff deconsolidation discussed
below. Two motives are of particular relevance to the protection of the
environment, mentioned in paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX. According to
these two paragraphs, WTO members may adopt policy measures that are
inconsistent with GATT disciplines, but necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health (paragraph (b)), or relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources (paragraph (g)).
Some authors have argued that policies aimed at reducing CO2 emissions
could fall under Article XX(b), as they intend to protect human beings from the
negative consequences of climate change (such as flooding or sea level rise), or
under Article XX(g), as they intend to conserve not only the planet’s climate but
also certain plant and animal species that may disappear because of global
warming.37
For a GATT-inconsistent environmental measure to be justified under Article
XX, a member must perform a two-tier analysis proving first that its measure falls
under at least one of the exceptions (e.g., paragraphs (b) and/or (g), two of the ten
exceptions under Article XX) and second that the measure satisfies the
requirements of the introductory paragraph (the ‘chapeau’ of Article XX), i.e., that
it is not applied in a manner which would constitute ‘a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,’
and is not ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’.38
36 T. Cottier, M. Oesch, International Trade Regulation. Law and Policy in the WTO, The European
Union and Switzerland, Cases Materials and Comments, Cameron May Ltd. London, 2005, p. 346.
37 J. Pauwelyn, US Federal Climate Policy and competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of
International Trade Law, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University,
Working Paper, 2007.
38 Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, p. 22.
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WTO jurisprudence has highlighted that relevant coordination and
cooperation activities undertaken by the defendant at the international level in the
trade and environment area may help to demonstrate that a measure is applied in
accordance with the chapeau.39 This is particularly relevant should international
negotiations on a new binding agreement fail and the concerned WTO member
introduces a unilateral trade measure such as tariff deconsolidation for the purpose
of climate change mitigation.
At the same time, it is also acknowledged that, ‘“as far as possible”, a
multilateral approach is strongly preferred’ to a unilateral approach.40
3.2 TRADE MEASURES AS CARROTS AND STICKS
3.2[a] Liberalizing Trade in Environmental Goods and Services
Liberalization of trade in environmental goods and services (EGS) can help
achieve climate change mitigation objectives through reducing the cost of access
to EGS, promoting environmentally preferable products and services, and creating
incentives for technology transfer.41 Both the Doha ministerial declaration as well
as UNCTAD42 specifically called for the reduction or elimination of tariffs on
EGS.43
EGS negotiations have witnessed major difficulties. It has been difficult to
achieve an overall balance between products of industrialized and developing
countries. Moreover, no differentiations were made on the basis of
environmentally friendly versus harmful production methods. By organizing
negotiations on the basis of specific target areas and goals, these difficulties could
39 For instance, in the US – Gasoline decision (p. 26), the Appellate Body considered that the United
States had not sufficiently explored the possibility of entering into cooperative arrangements with
affected countries in order to mitigate the administrative problems raised by the United States in
their justification of the discriminatory treatment. Furthermore, in US – Shrimp (Appellate Body,
US – Shrimp (Art. 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 134), the Appellate Body found that, in view of the
serious, good faith efforts made by the United States to negotiate an international agreement on
the protection of sea turtles, including with the complainant, the measure was applied in a manner
that no longer constituted a means of unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination.
40 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp (Art. 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 124.
41 O. Nartova, ‘Assessment of GATS’ Impact on Climate Change Mitigation’ in T. Cottier et al.
(eds.), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change, Cambridge
University Press, 2009, p. 259.
42 T. Cottier & D. Baracol, WTO Negotiations on Environmental Goods and Services: A Potential
Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2008/4,
2009.
43 Paragraph 31(iii) of the Doha Development Agenda.
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be better managed as negotiations would be more focused.44 The Environmental
Area Initiative approach offers a method which reduces negotiations complexity
by proceeding in certain steps, from political decisions in identifying relevant
climate change areas, to technical implementation. However, it has not been
implemented so far.
3.2[b] Taxation: Limits of Border Tax Adjustment
WTO regards taxation as a prime instrument of sovereignty and does not limit
member’s power to tax. However, it renders it subject to the principle of national
treatment,45 providing that imported products must not be subject to less
favourable tax than the member’s domestic products; the underlying principle here
is Article III:2 which stipulates that members must ensure equal taxation of
imported and domestic products hence providing for equal conditions of
competition.46
Recently the practice of border adjustment in international trade has attracted
much interest in the context of climate change. It is often said that in the US,
border adjustment measures are perceived as a ‘price of passage’ of any ambitious
climate bill establishing a cap-and-trade system at a federal level.47 The literature48
uses different terms, such as border tax adjustment, border carbon adjustment, and
border tax measures. However, all these measures boil down to the same unilateral
measures that a country imposes when a good is imported from a country where
climate policy is not ‘comparably effective’. What they have in common is that
they offset disadvantages for domestic production, re-establishing a level playing
field. Offsetting domestic taxation by imposing similar taxes on imports at the
border is considered lawful under Article II. The provision limits border tax
adjustment to the equivalent of an internal tax. It cannot exceed levels of domestic
taxation. In practice, there is no certainty that such taxes would be able to absorb
the levels of pollution caused by the production in the country of origin. Hence,
44 On EGS negotiations see in particular T.Cottier and D.Baracol-Pinhao, ‘Environmental goods and
services: the Environmental Area Initiative Approach and Climate Change’ in T. Cottier et al.
(eds.), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change, Cambridge
University Press, 2009, p. 395.
45 T. Cottier & M. Oesch, International Trade Regulation. Law and Policy in the WTO, The
European Union and Switzerland, Cases Materials and Comments, Cameron May Ltd. London,
2005, p. 580.
46 Ibid., p. 581.
47 K. Holzer, Current Legislative Proposals on Border Adjustment Measures for Climate Policy: Are
There Potential Conflicts with WTO Law? NCCR-Climate (subproject CITEL) research paper
2010/01.
48 For instance see K. Holzer, ‘Proposals on Carbon-Related Border Adjustments: Prospects for WTO
Compliance’, Carbon and Climate Law Review 1: 51–64.
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the measure may be insufficient to offset the price of carbon emissions. Unlike tax
adjustment, however, tariffs do not face this limitation and can be deconsolidated
as deemed necessary to capture effective levels of pollution by non-state of the art
technology.
3.3 TARIFFS AS A TOOL OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: THE NOTION OF TARIFFS
Although the word ‘tariff ’ is used in different contexts, the WTO application of
this term exclusively relates to taxes triggered by, and imposed upon, cross-border
movement of goods. They do not extend to domestic commerce. Import and
export tariffs are normally classified under three major categories based on the
principle of application: ad valorem, specific, and mixed or compound tariffs.Tariffs
need to be distinguished from customs-controlled, but essentially distinct levies
such as quotas, other duties, indirect taxes (e.g.,VAT) and service fees.
In the course of economic history, tariffs evolved from being an exclusive
source of governmental revenue to a multifaceted international trade tool.
Nowadays, the tariff system is used to perform the following commonly
recognized functions:49 an instrument of fiscal revenue; smoothing out the
differences among established regional and sectoral economic structures; providing
a degree of protection over infant industries; resolving military or security-related
issues; maintaining optimal balance of payments at a national level; and as punitive
measures in international trade disputes.
Since GATT 1947, the main drive byWTO members has been to achieve an
overall general reduction of rates in the national tariff systems. This has been
achieved through multiple rounds of negotiations on the basis of the GATT
framework of Article II and XXVIII and XXVIIIbis, and formalized in the
schedules of Tariff Concessions of each Member States or customs union. On
average, industrialized tariffs were reduced from around 40% in 1947 to around 4%
in 1995 upon completion of the Uruguay Round.The application of tariffs to a
great extent relies nowadays on the generally adopted customs product
specification called the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
(HS) developed by theWorld Customs Organization (WCO) and fully adopted by
WTO members and used by the organization in its work.
With the schedule of Tariff Concessions indicating a member’s level of
maximum tariff protection on each and every item of the HS,Article II propounds
and implements the overriding principle of MFN treatment in the field of tariffs
49 Thomas Cottier, Matthias Oesch, International Trade Regulation: Law and Policy in the WTO, the
European Union and Switzerland, Bern/London: Steaempfli and Cameron May, 2005, pp.
577–659. For a detailed and recent account of WTO, Swiss and EU tariff law see Remo
Arpgagaus, Zollrecht, 2nd ed. Basel: Helbing Lichtehahn 2007.
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and other duties. The article also lays down the crucial principle of Bound and
Unbound tariffs.The bound products inscribed in Part I of the schedule must not
be taxed in excess of stipulated levels, while unbound products do not carry such a
tariff ceiling. Most tariffs today are Bound tariffs and must not be exceeded.
However, it should be noted that such limitations are not without exceptions.50
The main and unresolved problem is whether tariff deconsolidation can be
undertaken on the basis of process and production methods. The issue is
controversially debated in the context of GATT Article III analysis.While some
argue that like product differentiation can be undertaken on the basis of PPMs
here and in the context of theTBT Agreement, other exclude such differentiation.
However, it is established in case law that distinctions based upon PPMs, in the
final analysis, can be operated under the exceptions of Article XX(g) discussed
above.51 The Appellate Body essentially agreed to distinctions based upon
production methods in the landmark case of Shrimps Turtle.52 These exceptions,
in our view, also apply to tariff reductions and, vice versa, to deconsolidation. It
will inform tariff policies taking into account levels of pollution caused by
production technology relating to the item taxed.
3.4 DIFFERENTIAL REDUCTION OF TARIFFS
Article XXVIIIbis of the GATT 1994 encourages members to increasingly lower
and bind maximum tariff ceilings, a process which has been largely completed for
industrialized and developing countries alike. Unbound tariffs, by definition, are
open to increases and thus do not offer legal security. They undermine the very
purpose of tariff disciplines in the WTO and are detrimental to attracting foreign
direct investment. Since the Uruguay Round, bound or consolidated tariffs are the
rule, and unbound tariffs the exception.
A first option consists of lowering tariffs for products conducive to carbon
reduction, learning the lessons from failed EGS negotiations discussed above.
Products supporting low carbon emissions, and products made with low carbon
technologies can be defined in HS digits 6 to 8 of a tariff position of the
Harmonized Systems. For these digits, tariffs could be reduced or even eliminated.
The approach builds upon the idea pursued in negotiations on EGS during the
Doha Development Agenda. Given the difficulties encountered, it is more
50 See e.g., Art. II:2(b) of the GATT 1994, which explicitly exempts anti-dumping and
countervailing duties applied consistently with Art.VI.
51 See R. Christiane Conrad, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law: Interfacing
Trade and Social Goals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011.
52 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimps and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body,
12 Oct. 1998,WT/DS58/AB/R.
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promising to work on the basis of an Environmental Area Approach, including all
related products conducing for a low carbon economy. But foremost, it
differentiates tariffs among like products on the basis of carbon-intensity of the
product and related processes.These items may be negotiated multilaterally under
the umbrella of Article XXVIIIbis GATT. Or, they may be introduced unilaterally
by individual members on the basis of newly defined HS digits 6 to 8 of the
respective tariff position.
3.5 DECONSOLIDATION OF BOUND TARIFFS
Alternatively, tariffs may also be increased in carbon sensitive areas. Instead of, or
complementary to, the reduction of tariffs for green technology and products,
highly polluting products may be identified and defined in HS digits 6 to 8 of a
tariff position unilaterally increased.This can readily be done for unbound tariffs.
Yet, it can also be effected for bound tariffs.WTO law provides particular rules and
procedures to this effect.
Bound or consolidated tariffs are not irreversible in WTO law. Members can
deconsolidate bound tariffs by offering compensation on different tariff lines to
the members primarily affected by such deconsolidation. In case compensation
fails, members affected may eventually suspend market access rights upon
authorization by dispute settlement.WTO tariff law thus offers ample flexibility in
accommodating the changing needs of Member States.
Deconsolidation is addressed in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 and by
corresponding notes, the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII
of the GATT 199453 and the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII
adopted on 10 November 1980.54 The principles and procedures of
deconsolidation are based on the idea of preserving reciprocal and mutually
advantageous trade relations. In practice, tariff deconsolidations are not frequent, as
governments tend to negotiate tariff bindings beyond the tariff levels actually in
existence.55 This leaves them with the option to increase applied tariffs up to the
bound level. The difference between bound and applied levels offers particular
problems in negotiations as offered reductions may be ineffective and remain what
is called ‘water in the pipe’.
AWTO member can increase its bound protection on a given item provided
that the multilateral process included in Article XXVIII has been followed.
53 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/12-28_e.htm.
54 GATT, Basic Instruments and Documents BISD 27S at 26 (1981).
55 T. Cottier & M. Oesch, International Trade Regulation. Law and Policy in the WTO, The
European Union and Switzerland, Cases Materials and Comments, Cameron May Ltd. London,
2005, p. 606.
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Typically, a member wishing to raise its duties will negotiate and agree
compensation with a subset of the WTO membership. Negotiation will involve
the WTO member holding initial negotiating rights (INR), the WTO member
that qualifies as the Principal Supplying Interest (PSI) member and the WTO
member having a substantial interest (SI).56 The latter is consulted but does not
have a legal right to participate in the negotiations.The agreed compensation will
be applied on an MFN basis.
In case no agreement is reached, the requesting WTO member is free to
increase its tariff protection and the main affected members would then have the
right to withdraw substantially equivalent tariff concessions. The procedures to
reduce tariff commitments are set out in Article XXVIII GATT.These provisions
provide for three different avenues. In two of them there is no need to secure
approval ofWTO membership before negotiations.
Article XXVIII.1 provides that the requesting WTO member must initiate
negotiations during a specified period from July to October in any three year
period starting on 1 January 1958 (or during any other period defined by
consensus or two-thirds of the membership). The requesting member notifies
the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) of its interest to initiate negotiations.The
CTG then identifies the primarily concerned members in accordance with the
1994 Understanding. In case agreement with them is not reached, the WTO
member can go ahead and unilaterally modify its concessions, running a risk of
retaliation. Article XXVIII.3 explicitly acknowledges that the WTO member has
the right to modify unilaterally its schedule of concessions, even in the absence of
agreed compensation. Both the primary concerned members and SIs can
withdraw substantially equivalent concessions on goods initially negotiated with
the requesting member.
The second category of procedures with no prior approval is described in
Article XXVIII.5.WTO members can reserve their right to renegotiate at a later
date.These procedures have one important downside – the right can be exercised
only within a particular time period.
WTO members that have not reserved their right to renegotiate or who wish
to negotiate outside the period prescribed in Article XXVIII.1, can do so only if
they have first secured the authorization from the WTO membership under
Article XXVIII.4. The WTO member concerned will submit its request to the
CTG and the latter will decide. A short period for renegotiations (sixty days) is
granted. If no agreement can be reached, the CTG will determine whether
adequate compensation in terms of tariff reductions on appropriate items has been
offered in order to restore the overall balance and levels of market access. If it does,
56 These terms are defined by the 1994 Understanding, supra n. 56.
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the modified concession will be allowed to stand.Yet, in the alternative, a unilateral
modification is still allowed, in which case a primary concerned members as well
as SIs have the right to retaliate by suspending equivalent tariff concessions. In
conclusion, members retain a right to unilaterally increase tariffs subject to
compensation to, and retaliation by, other affected members. In all three types of
negotiations, the requesting state identifies a commodity the tariff of which it
wishes to modify, and the primary concerned members will identify the
commodity where compensation will be paid. Compensation for increased tariffs
can be in the form of lowering tariffs for certain environmental goods.
3.6 CONCLUSION
Members of the WTO are in a position to differentiate tariffs on the basis of
product quality and on the basis of production and process methods.WTO law
does not prevent members from jointly negotiating tariff differentiation in tariff
negotiations. They may jointly agree to alter the tariff classification of the
Harmonized System within the World Customs Organization. They may
unilaterally amend tariff schedules on sensitive position either by introducing low
or zero tariffs for low carbon products and processes in HS digits 6 to 8.
Alternatively, they may deconsolidate carbon intensive products and processes and
increase tariffs in order to deter importation and create incentives to adopt
technologies suitable for low tariff treatment.
While tariff reductions are preferable, as they do not trigger compensation or
retaliation, the option of tariff deconsolidation on polluting products and processes
is equally available, in particular where low carbon technology and like products
simply are not available. Deconsolidation is either accompanied by compensation,
or by the right of those affected mostly to withdraw equivalent tariff concessions.
Members, therefore, may contemplate to increase import tariffs on specific highly
polluting products detrimental to carbon reduction goals and to render market
access for such products more costly and less competitive. Deconsolidation can
focus on specific products which will be defined in digit 6 to 8 of the HS tariff
position.
Based upon MFN, import tariffs in WTO law need to be imposed erga
omnes, and cannot distinguish among countries unless the conditions of the
exemption of Article XXIV GATT are met. A global system on emission targets
and control, however, does not amount to a free trade agreement or a customs
union. Members within the system and those outside need to be treated alike.
How then is it possible to create inccentives to join the multilateral system of
carbon reduction in the first place? It is submitted that differentiation among
countries will take place on the basis of commitments to transfer of technology
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and knowhow enabling producers within the system to produce products in line
with low tariff digits of the HS position concerned. Members outside the system
will face greater difficulties to meet these standards.As a consequence, they will be
subject to relatively higher tariff position for polluting products, either by tariff
reductions for carbon friendly products, or by increased tariffs on carbon-intensive
products and processes. Based upon these options legally available inWTO law, we
turn to assessing the impact of such policies. The model applied is based upon
deconsolidation and tariff increases for selected highly carbon intensive products
and processes the use and trade of which should be strongly discouraged from the
point of view of mitigating climate change.We do not consider in this study the
economic impact of tariff reductions on low carbon products and processes.
4 TRADE EFFECTS OF DECONSOLIDATED CARBONTARIFFS
To further study the potential role of tariffs in climate policy, we explore the
option of a unilateral increase in tariffs on the imports of the most
carbon-intensive products (as identified in this literature) from countries not
committed to climate polices (non-Annex I, Kyoto Protocol) through a partial
equilibrium simulation exercise. The importing countries considered in this
analysis include Australia, Canada, the EC, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland, and USA.57 The list of exporters include Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, the Philippines, Russia,58 South Africa,
South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, and the US. Significantly, these countries account
for 70%–80% of global CO2 emissions over 1996–2008. Products for this analysis
include the most carbon-intensive products identified in this literature59 – paper,
rubber, glass, plastics, iron & steel, cement, and basic chemicals.60
To begin with, we conduct preliminary statistical analyses to study the
importance of these products in the trade flows of both importing and exporting
countries. Table 1 looks at the import share of these products in the importing
countries’ (reported in columns) total imports from the exporting countries
(reported in rows) for the year 200561 and documents the importance of
carbon-intensive trade in the import profiles of several of these countries (shares in
57 Although the US has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, given its position as the largest polluter in
the world in terms of per capita emissions, it was decided to include it amongst the importers as
well as the exporters.
58 Both Russia and Turkey are Annex I countries, but they are net carbon-exporters and hence were
included in the list of exporting countries.
59 For instance see Reinaud (2008).
60 The nomenclature used was ISIC Rev.3.
61 This is the latest year for which import and tariff data is the most complete for our sample of
countries and products.
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excess of 15% have been highlighted in the table). For instance, in the year 2005,
these products accounted for more than 40% of Australia’s total imports from
Chile and Russia; more than a third of Canada’s total imports from Argentina;
close to 70% of New Zealand’s total imports from Russia; and more than 40% of
Swiss total imports from Mexico.
Table 1 Share of Carbon-Intensive Products in Importing Countries’Total Imports
from Exporters (Year 2005)
Exporter/
Importer
Australia Canada EU Iceland Japan NZ Norway Switzerland USA
World 11.3 12.9 8.8 10.1 7.8 13.1 13.7 14.1 10.0
Argentina 9.5 35.9 7.9 0.1 3.5 12.0 20.6 3.4 11.7
Brazil 19.0 18.3 14.6 1.6 8.8 4.5 1.2 12.4 20.0
Chile 42.6 1.8 13.4 3.5 4.3 3.7 17.2 21.9 6.9
China 9.9 8.0 6.1 5.5 7.5 9.4 5.0 14.1 6.7
India 14.9 14.4 13.5 31.5 8.4 13.0 6.4 23.6 10.1
Indonesia 9.1 10.3 8.0 15.8 6.4 22.0 20.9 10.1 6.1
Israel 25.0 12.2 16.9 11.9 9.4 18.4 10.2 8.1 4.6
South
Korea
17.1 13.7 6.8 5.8 20.3 26.4 7.1 12.1 11.0
Mexico 3.5 4.3 10.3 6.6 1.9 9.3 9.2 42.3 5.5
Philippines 8.7 1.3 1.9 0.5 3.9 7.8 2.7 2.0 2.2
Russia 44.6 13.1 8.0 18.6 4.5 69.3 9.5 10.5 14.6
South
Africa
15.6 22.1 15.2 1.8 13.1 25.1 6.8 1.6 18.8
Thailand 9.2 9.3 7.4 3.6 8.6 14.3 5.1 3.1 8.4
Turkey 12.7 27.6 9.8 4.5 5.5 7.4 4.3 4.0 15.9
USA 12.2 16.0 11.6 6.1 9.7 10.7 9.2 8.5 N/A
Source:WTO’s IDB throughWorld BankWITS; author’s calculations.
Analogously,Table 2 looks at the export shares of these products in the exporting
countries’ (reported in rows) total exports to the importing countries (reported in
columns) for 200562 and once again, documents the importance of
carbon-intensive trade in the export profiles of many of these countries (shares in
excess of 15% have been highlighted in the table). For instance, in 2005, these
products accounted for 40% of Chilean and more than 60% of Russian exports to
62 In the case of the Philippines, the data pertain to 2007.
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Australia; more than a third of Argentinean and Turkish exports to Canada; nearly
half of Russian exports to Iceland; nearly 80% of Mexican exports to Norway and
Russian exports to New Zealand; and more than a third of Russian exports to
the US.
Table 2 Share of Carbon-Intensive Products in Exporters’Total Exports to the
Importing Countries (Year 2005)
Exporter/
Importer
Australia Canada EU Iceland Japan NZ Norway Switzerland USA
World 11.3 14.1 14.4 9.3 7.9 12.9 13.4 12.6 9.9
Argentina 11.2 36.1 7.7 3.1 12.5 37.8 1.4 11.7
Brazil 15.2 17.2 13.1 1.8 11 6.3 1.3 24.7 20.8
Chile 40.5 1.7 15.1 13 2.6 4.8 0.4 0.2 6.9
China 12.3 10.4 7.1 6.8 8.1 12.4 6.6 6.7 7.7
India 16.1 17.8 12.7 9.9 13.4 5.8 21.8 10.3
Israel 28.8 15.8 18.4 13.3 12.7 29.7 15.9 2.3 5.3
South
Korea
21.2 16.8 5.9 3.9 20.4 25.2 6.1 6.1 11.5
Mexico 4.5 5 11.9 8.1 2.3 18.7 78.6 18.9 5.5
Philippines 7.6 1.4 2.6 6.2 3.6 16.3 4.2 2.1
Russia 63.3 32.1 8.9 47.0 4.0 77.8 15.5 3.2 36.6
South
Africa
12.7 23.7 17.4 1.2 13.2 24.9 7.2 3.7 25.8
Thailand 11.7 9 7.5 2.3 8.2 15.3 5.4 5.9 9.8
Turkey 11.4 34.7 9.3 4.1 4.4 11.4 4.6 4.5 17.7
USA 9.9 16 12.0 4.8 11.4 9.6 7.7 5.2 N/A
Source: UN Comtrade throughWorld BankWITS; authors’ calculations.
The tariff picture is reported in Table 3 and shows that the average simple applied
tariffs across these products are low in all the importing countries (reported in
columns) in our sample; in several cases (highlighted in the table), the average
applied tariffs are less than 1%, even zero. In fact, the applied tariffs in Norway and
Switzerland on the import of all these products from the exporting countries in
our sample are zero. This said, the tariffs are relatively higher in Australia, EU,
Iceland, and New Zealand.
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Table 3 Average Simple AppliedTariffs (%) on Exporters’ Carbon-Intensive
Products in Destination Markets (Year 2005)
Exporter/
Importer
Australia Canada EU Iceland Japan NZ USA
World 3.1 1.5 2.9 1.0 0.9 2.7 1.4
Argentina 4.0 1.1 2.8 6.3 0.1 4.5 0.6
Brazil 4.0 0.9 2.8 3.1 0.1 2.6 0.5
Chile 3.4 0.0 3.2 2.1 0.5 2.4 0.2
China 3.1 0.9 2.8 3.6 0.0 2.7 2.0
India 3.3 1.0 2.8 4.0 0.0 3.2 0.8
Indonesia 3.3 1.3 2.7 3.6 0.0 2.8 0.6
Israel 3.8 0.0 2.8 4.1 1.1 2.8 0.0
South Korea 3.8 1.0 2.8 2.3 1.4 2.9 2.0
Mexico 4.3 0.0 2.9 3.3 0.1 3.3 0.1
Philippines 3.3 1.4 2.9 7.6 0.0 2.9 0.6
Russia 4.0 1.0 2.8 4.7 1.4 2.7 0.8
South Africa 4.2 0.9 2.9 4.7 0.1 3.1 0.0
Thailand 0.5 1.0 2.8 3.7 0.0 2.8 0.5
Turkey 3.9 0.9 2.9 3.3 0.0 2.8 0.6
USA 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.5 1.3 2.6 N/A
Source:WTO’s IDB throughWorld BankWITS; authors’ calculations.
In view of the lack of variation in these tariffs to enable more sophisticated
empirical analysis, we employ partial equilibrium analysis using import demand
elasticities from Kee et. al. (2008)63 to simulate the impact of an increase in tariffs,
which we assume to be 5%.Assuming no other intervention, a tariff imposition or
a change in tariffs has a direct impact on import prices64 and the import demand
elasticity measures the responsiveness of imports to a change in these import
63 H.L. Kee, A. Nicita & M. Olarreaga, ‘Import Demand Elasticities and Trade Distortions’, The
Review of Economics & Statistics, November 2008,Vol. 90, No. 4, Pp 666–682.
64 If a specific per unit tariff ‘t’ is imposed on a product with a pre-tariff price ‘p’ then its post-tariff
price is p(1+t).
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prices, calculated as the ratio of the percentage change in imports to the
percentage change in import prices.65
Following Viner (1950), any change in tariffs is likely to result in both trade
creation (TC) and trade diversion (TD) effects.Thus, using theWorld BankWITS
SMART model, we estimate both these effects from a 5% increase in tariffs of the
most carbon-intensive traded products.
More specifically,TC = εk,i*Mk,i*{dtk,i/(1+tk,i)} and
TD = {(Mk,i*Mk,≠i)/(Mk,i+Mk,≠i)}*(dtk,i/(1+tk,i))*σk,i≠i
Where
εk,i = import demand elasticity of product k imported from country i
Mk,i = value of imports of product k imported from country i
dtk,i = change in tariff on product k imported from country i
tk,i = simple applied tariff on product k imported from country i
Mk,≠i = value of imports of product k imported from all other countries except i
(≠i)
σk,i≠i = elasticity of substitution across imports of product k from country i and all
other countries (≠i)
Unfortunately, the import demand elasticities in Kee et.al. (2008) have been
calculated with respect to global imports and not bilaterally for each trading pair in
our sample.We thus have to use the same elasticities for each trading pair in our
sample which is a limitation of this analysis. To that extent, the results from the
simulation are more indicative than exact. However, given the importance of these
products in the trade flows of our sample countries, the elastic import demand for
five of these six products and the low applied tariffs on their imports, the impact of
a 5% tariff increase on trade in these carbon-intensive products and by extension
on the countries’ overall trade would be non-trivial.The elasticities from Kee et al.
(2008) are reported inTable 4.66
65 Demand for a product is said to be elastic (inelastic) if the absolute value of the computed
elasticity is greater than (less than) unity.
66 The authors have calculated these elasticities at the ISIC Rev. 2 classification, which is what we
use in the analysis. These elasticities were not available separately for cement and cement products,
which are therefore excluded from the partial simulation analysis. The results in Table 5 therefore
pertain to the remaining six carbon-intensive products only.
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Table 4 Import Demand Elasticities for Carbon-Intensive Products
Importer/
Product
Paper Basic
chemicals
Rubber Plastic Glass Basic iron
and steel
Australia -1.28 -1.01 -1.04 -0.95 -1.01 -1.00
Canada -1.20 -1.02 -1.03 -0.97 -1.01 -1.01
EU -1.13 -1.03 -1.03 -0.98 -1.00 -1.01
Iceland -1.13 -1.02 -1.03 -0.99 -1.01 -1.01
Israel -1.19 -1.02 -1.05 -0.97 -1.01 -1.01
Japan -2.27 -1.02 -1.37 -0.81 -1.04 -1.00
NZ -1.16 -1.02 -1.04 -0.97 -1.01 -1.01
Norway -1.16 -1.02 -1.04 -0.98 -1.01 -1.01
Switzerland -1.14 -1.03 -1.04 -0.98 -1.01 -1.01
USA -1.70 -1.02 -1.11 -0.92 -1.02 -1.00
Source: Kee et al. (2008).
Interestingly, our simulation results suggested a net increase in imports of these
carbon-intensive products from a 5% increase in tariffs if we considered each
importing country in isolation, as the (positive) trade diversion effects exceeded
the (negative) trade creation effects in almost all cases.67 The simulation results
from unilateral tariff policy are reported in Table 5. Across importing and
exporting countries, these results suggest an average 5% reduction in imports from
only trade creation effects but an average 2% increase in imports with the
inclusion of trade diversion effects in the analyses. The only exceptions are
Japanese imports from China and Canadian imports from USA; in each case, the
magnitude of trade creation exceeds that of trade diversion so that the overall
effect is a net reduction in imports (-0.4% for Japan-China and 3% for
Canada-USA).
67 Note that, traditionally, the signs of trade creation and trade diversion effects are positive and
negative, respectively, as we usually consider a reduction in tariffs. However, the signs are reversed
in our results as we are simuating the effect of a rise in tariffs.
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In view of these results, it may be possible that tariff policy would succeed in
reducing overall trade in carbon-intensive products if all importing countries were
to consider raising tariffs on carbon-intensive products as a ‘group’ and not in
isolation. Results from such ‘plurilateral’ action are reported in Table 6 and suggest
that the former would be more effective, leading to an average 1.4% net reduction
in imports of carbon-intensive products from our sample countries.
Table 6 Trade Creation andTrade Diversion Effects (as a Share of Imports) from a
Plurilateral 5% Increase in the Average Simple AppliedTariff (Year 2005)
Product TC ($ mn) TD ($ mn) (TC/M)% TC+TD ($
mn)
(TC+TD)/
M%
Paper -1211.0 843.2 -6.6 -367.8 -2.0
Chemicals -2976.2 2828.8 -5.0 -147.4 -0.2
Rubber -770.4 549.0 -5.2 -221.5 -1.5
Plastics -1371.6 961.6 -4.6 -410.0 -1.4
Glass -392.3 255.5 -4.9 -136.9 -1.7
Iron & steel -2115.8 1517.0 -5.0 -598.8 -1.4
Average -1472.9 1159.2 -5.2 -313.7 -1.4
Source:WTO’s IDB throughWorld BankWITS; authors’ calculations.
Understandably, there could be significant displacement effects from such a policy
change, which are conveniently assumed away in a partial equilibrium model such
as this. For instance, would domestic production meet the excess demand which
was earlier met by these imports? Would there be sufficient domestic capacity to
do so? Would more trade be diverted to climate-friendly or climate-unfriendly
partners? Will climate friendly exports be able to displace climate unfriendly
products, or will these simply be sold elsewhere? These are all credible questions
that will have to be addressed in a general equilibrium framework.This said, our
partial equilibrium results suggest tariff policy as suggested in this article is more
likely to achieve its objectives if a critical mass of climate-friendly importing
countries was to plurilaterally raise tariffs on carbon-intensive imports.This would
also ensure that the trade diversion effects and the possibility of trade in
carbon-intensive products being diverted to climate-unfriendly countries are
minimized. As for Border Tax Adjustment in carbon tariffs, market size plays a
significant role.While large markets may lead off unilaterally, small and medium
size countries are unlikely to achieve appropriate effects without a coalition of
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like-minded countries. Such a collation could therefore be found within a future
multilateral system on climate change following the Kyoto Protocol.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Combining legal and economic analysis in this article, we conclude that members
of the WTO are in a position to considerably influence trade of highly
carbon-intensive products by marginally adjusting and increasing tariffs levels.
WTO members could engage in enhanced product differenation based upon
carbon friendly and carbon unfriendly like products within existing tariffs
positions.They can multilaterally agree on this by revising the Harmonized System
adjusting tariff schedules. They can also do so unilaterally by taking recourse to
shaping HS digits 6 to 8 of respective tariff positions.They can lower or eliminate
tariffs on carbon friendly products and processes. Vice versa, they can deconsolidate
tariffs on carbon-unfriendly products, focusing on a limited number of highly
polluting products.They can employ a combination of both.
The study submits that trade of such products can be reduced considerably by
reverting to agreed mechanisms of tariff deconsolidation in WTO law, either
multilaterally agreed or unilaterally.These increases are subject to compensation on
other tariff lines, which could be offered for clean products in terms of climate
change mitigation policies. Deconsolidation, in our view, can be based upon PPM
related criteria, and distinctions of tariff lines based upon production methods of
the same products can, in principle be justified by Article XX(g) of the GATT
1994. At the same time, we note that such measures are subject to compensation,
are likely to have significant displacement effects and are also likely to attract
retaliatory measures. While tariff deconsolidation is a legitimate instrument of
trade policy, it must be noted that in the absence of an agreement on
compensation, unilateral measures would likely elicit comparable retaliation by
affected countries, especially emerging economies, and therefore can easily trigger
trade wars.68
Recourse to tariff policies in climate change mitigation therefore requires a
careful analysis of trade flows and interests at stake. It is evident that they always
will be second best. Hence, we do not suggest that tariff deconsolidation be widely
used as a mechanism of emissions reduction but rather that it serve as a tool to
express the state’s concerns and priorities and provide an incentive to its trade
partners to join a post-Kyoto international climate agreement. Article 3.5 of the
UNFCCC, which borrows language from GATT Article XX, states that the
68 According to Hufbauer, a state first needs to ‘make an exceptional effort to negotiate agreed
international rules before blocking imports or penalizing foreign GHG control measures’.
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‘Means taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade …’. However, when political reasons prevent
certain polluting countries from participating in the multilateral effort to curb
greenhouse gas emissions, punitive trade measures can be the only effective resort.
Deconsolidation is at its best if not used, but taken into account as a risk and
thus as an incentive to join a future international system on climate change
mitigation. In light of tariff measures – exceeding the limits of border tax
adjustment – powerful and effective incentives exist to convince major producing
countries to join a multilateral system with a view to avoiding the imposition of
deconsolidation and the potential need to engage in retaliation and a cycle of
potentially harmful and welfare reducing tariff increases among members of the
WTO. A firm commitment to exclude deconsolidation of tariffs within a
multilateral system of climate change, refraining from the exercise of WTO rights
in return for committing to multilateral disciplines of capping, offers the potential
to convince governments and industries to seek participation and to abandon the
road of unilateral climate change policies and related risks attached to it in trade
policy.
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